Modeling the Evolution of Political Ideologies

dc.contributor.author	Abeliuk, Andrés
dc.contributor.author	Fernández Anta, Antonio
dc.contributor.author	Obradovich, Nick
dc.contributor.author	Rahwan, Iyad
dc.date.accessioned	2021-07-13T09:31:11Z
dc.date.available	2021-07-13T09:31:11Z
dc.date.issued	2017-07-10
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12761/457
dc.description.abstract	Our work intends to shed new insights into the debate of polarization by using a multidisciplinary approach that applies Evolutionary Game Theory to study the evolution of public ideology in US. In particular, we use the replicator equation to model political ideology as a dynamic game, where strategies reproduce at a rate proportional to their payoffs. Evolutionary game theory has explicit biological roots, where payoffs represent fitness as the underlying process of natural selection. However, these models can also be thought of as models of cultural evolution.
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.title	Modeling the Evolution of Political Ideologies	en
dc.type	conference object
dc.conference.date	10-13 July 2017
dc.conference.place	Cologne, Germany
dc.conference.title	The 3rd Annual International Conference on Computational Social Science (IC2S2 2017)	*
dc.event.type	conference
dc.pres.type	poster
dc.type.hasVersion	VoR
dc.rights.accessRights	open access
dc.description.refereed	TRUE
dc.description.status	pub
dc.eprint.id	http://eprints.networks.imdea.org/id/eprint/1684