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dc.contributor.authorAbeliuk, Andrés
dc.contributor.authorFernández Anta, Antonio 
dc.contributor.authorObradovich, Nick
dc.contributor.authorRahwan, Iyad
dc.date.accessioned2021-07-13T09:31:11Z
dc.date.available2021-07-13T09:31:11Z
dc.date.issued2017-07-10
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12761/457
dc.description.abstractOur work intends to shed new insights into the debate of polarization by using a multidisciplinary approach that applies Evolutionary Game Theory to study the evolution of public ideology in US. In particular, we use the replicator equation to model political ideology as a dynamic game, where strategies reproduce at a rate proportional to their payoffs. Evolutionary game theory has explicit biological roots, where payoffs represent fitness as the underlying process of natural selection. However, these models can also be thought of as models of cultural evolution.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.titleModeling the Evolution of Political Ideologiesen
dc.typeconference object
dc.conference.date10-13 July 2017
dc.conference.placeCologne, Germany
dc.conference.titleThe 3rd Annual International Conference on Computational Social Science (IC2S2 2017)*
dc.event.typeconference
dc.pres.typeposter
dc.type.hasVersionVoR
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.description.refereedTRUE
dc.description.statuspub
dc.eprint.idhttp://eprints.networks.imdea.org/id/eprint/1684


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